


AIRPROX REPORT No 2020112

Date: 05 Sep 2020 Time: 1331Z Position: 5058N 00156W Location: 7NM east Compton Abbas

PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	P68	Unknown glider
Operator	Civ Comm	Civ Gld
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	None	
Provider	Changing frequency	
Altitude/FL	FL035	
Transponder	A, C, S	
Reported		
Colours	White, Blue	
Lighting	Strobe, Nav	
Conditions	VMC	
Visibility	>10km	
Altitude/FL	3700	
Altimeter	QNH	
Heading	190°	
Speed	130kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Unknown
Separation		
Reported	60ft V/50-75m H	NK
Recorded	NK	



THE P68 PILOT reports that they had just finished surveying and were heading towards their destination. After requesting a frequency change from London Info and while inputting the new frequency they suddenly noticed a glider, wings level, at what appeared to be the same altitude, in their 10-11 o'clock flying towards them. The autopilot was disconnected, and a right turn commenced in order to diverge. Whilst turning, they noticed the oncoming traffic commencing a turn to its right approximately 3-4 seconds after they had commenced their turn.

The pilot assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

THE UNKNOWN GLIDER PILOT could not be traced.

THE LONDON INFORMATION FISO reports that the P68 pilot requested to leave the frequency, they were advised of para activity and asked to squawk 7000. After leaving the frequency nothing else was reported. The FISO was informed that subsequently the P68 pilot reported an Airprox with a glider.

Factual Background

The weather at Bournemouth was recorded as follows:

METAR EGGH 051320Z 31013KT 9999 FEW038 SCT048 17/07 Q1023

Analysis and Investigation

CAA ATSI

The P68 pilot had been receiving a Basic Service from London FIS. After leaving the FIS frequency but before they contacted Bournemouth ATC, the pilot of the P68 reported an Airprox with a white

glider. Both aircraft turned right to avoid. No corresponding radar return was observed relating to the glider.

Information available to the investigation included:

- CA4114 from the London Flight Information FISO
- Radar and R/T recordings
- Airprox report from the pilot of P68

The P68 pilot was undertaking a survey flight to the southwest of Boscombe Down. The pilot was in receipt of a Basic Service from London FIS.

At 13:29:31Z, the pilot of the P68 reported, “We’ve finished surveying for now and we’d like to freecall Bournemouth Radar.” The London FISO instructed the pilot to squawk 7000, and then advised the pilot that there was parachuting taking place at Old Sarum.

The pilot of the P68 subsequently filed an Airprox report.

Analysis of the radar at the time of the event showed that one right turn was made by the pilot of the P68 in the time period between leaving the London FIS frequency and selecting a squawk assigned by Bournemouth ATC. At the time of the right turn (Figure 1) there were no corresponding radar returns to indicate the presence of a glider.



Figure 1

The pilot reported that there was no Traffic Information provided from London FIS at the time, however no prior notification had been given to London FIS of any gliding activity and as a non-radar unit no Traffic Information could have been provided.

UKAB Secretariat

The P68 and unknown glider pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.¹ If the incident geometry is considered as head-on or nearly so then both pilots were required to turn to the right.²

A primary only track was visible on the radar replay but faded prior to CPA. The initial track was commensurate with the P68 pilot’s report of the unknown glider, but it could not be fully identified as the conflicting aircraft (Figure 2) and would not have been known to the London Information FISO.

¹ SERA.3205 Proximity.

² SERA.3210 Right-of-way (c)(1) Approaching head-on.



Figure 2: P68 squawk 1177

Summary

An Airprox was reported when a P68 and an unknown glider flew into proximity about 7NM east of Compton Abbas at about 1331Z on Saturday 5th September 2020. The P68 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC and changing frequency from London Information to Bournemouth. The glider pilot could not be traced.

PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS

Information available consisted of reports from both pilots, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate operating authorities. Relevant contributory factors mentioned during the Board's discussions are highlighted within the text in bold, with the numbers referring to the Contributory Factors table displayed in Part C.

Due to the exceptional circumstances presented by the coronavirus pandemic, this incident was assessed as part of a 'virtual' UK Airprox Board meeting where members provided a combination of written contributions and dial-in/VTC comments.

The Board began by looking at the actions of the P68 pilot. They had been changing frequency when they looked out of the cockpit and saw the glider heading towards them (**CF2**), they quickly disengaged the autopilot and turned to avoid (**CF3**). Members said that this was another example of an aircraft carrying out a survey task without a suitable fitted electronic warning system³. The Board recognises that, until all warning systems are mandated to operate within a common classification, current equipment will not necessarily identify all conflicting aircraft. However, a suitable electronic warning system (or other focussed mitigations) would enhance the safety of the operational environment for crews carrying out surveying tasks.

The P68 pilot was between air traffic agencies when the Airprox occurred. Members noted that there is a limited level of LARS coverage on a Saturday in the area that the Airprox occurred, despite the fact that it is an area of high traffic levels with both powered aircraft and gliders.

The glider pilot could not be traced but the P68 pilot reported that they saw the glider turn away after the P68 pilot had commenced a turn to avoid the glider.

Turning to the risk the Board agreed that both pilots had apparently seen each other and turned to avoid. Neither pilot had any information regarding the other aircraft (**CF1**), and it was see-and-avoid

³ Several ongoing recommendations have been made by the UK Airprox Board for companies that operate survey aircraft to consider further mitigations to MAC. See recommendations for Airprox 2019201, 2019208, 2019206 and 2019227

that had enabled the pilots to increase the separation between the aircraft. Members agreed that there was no risk of collision, but safety had been degraded, a Risk Category C.

PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS AND RISK

Contributory Factors:

2020112			
CF	Factor	Description	Amplification
Flight Elements			
• Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action			
1	Contextual	• Situational Awareness and Sensory Events	Pilot had no, late or only generic, Situational Awareness
• See and Avoid			
2	Human Factors	• Distraction - Job Related	Pilot looking elsewhere
3	Human Factors	• Monitoring of Other Aircraft	Late-sighting by one or both pilots

Degree of Risk: C.


Safety Barrier Assessment⁴

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

Flight Elements:

Situational Awareness of the Conflicting Aircraft and Action were assessed as **ineffective** because neither pilot had any information about the other aircraft.

See and Avoid were assessed as **partially effective** because the P68 pilot saw the glider late and made an emergency avoiding action turn. It is not known if the glider pilot saw the P68.



⁴ The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).